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ABSTRACT 
 
EVALUATING CONTRADICTING AND CONFIRMING EVIDENCE: A STUDY ON 
BELIEFS AND MOTIVATED REASONING 
 
by Zachary A. Caddick 
The purpose of this study is to examine ideological, psychological, and demographic 
predictors of motivated reasoning.  Three-hundred and seventy-seven participants from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system completed written responses critically evaluating 
strengths and weaknesses in a vignette on the topic of anthropogenic climate change.  
The vignette has two fictional scientists present prototypical arguments for and against 
anthropogenic climate change that are constructed with equally flawed and conflicting 
reasoning from both view points.  Written responses were coded by a team of trained and 
reliability assessed qualitative raters.  Motivated reasoning is operationalized by 
providing supporting evidence for the congruent belief and counter evidence against the 
incongruent belief.  We found higher levels of dogmatism and lower levels of 
neuroticism in those engaging in motivated reasoning.  Participants who supported 
anthropogenic climate change had equal levels of need for cognition, adoption of 
scientific attitudes, and openness to experience to participants who did not accept 
anthropogenic climate change, but were less conservative and more neurotic.  Participant 
reasoning was predominately assessed as encompassing valid statements, supporting the 
notion that reasoning about beliefs and corresponding evidence creates directional 
reasoning and not necessarily invalid reasoning. 
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Introduction 
Why do some people gravitate toward unscientific explanations of events and others 
toward scientific explanations?  The tendency to explain natural phenomena with answers 
that are incongruent with known scientific understandings permeates many aspects of 
society.  Beliefs stemming from pseudoscience, the supernatural and paranormal, 
conspiracy theories, magical thinking, and superstition all stand in defiance to scientific 
explanations about the material universe.  
In the pursuit of understanding how beliefs that are incongruent with scientific 
understandings remain prominent in an increasingly scientifically advanced world, a 
number of psychological variables must be considered.  One such psychological variable 
is motivated reasoning.  Motivated reasoning is a type of bias in which one is motivated 
to reason differently about information that supports one’s prior beliefs compared to 
information that is incongruent with one’s prior beliefs (Kunda, 1990).  Whenever 
individuals are subjected to new information related to a prior belief, motivated reasoning 
is a possible agent influencing the maintenance of a belief.  In recent times, motivated 
reasoning can be seen in beliefs about anthropogenic climate change (i.e., human caused 
climate change) which have sparked considerable debate and controversy. 
Anthropogenic climate change (ACC) is a topic that has been entrenched in the 
United States' political discourse with fevered debates from prominent figures on either 
side of the issue.  Although political consensus surrounding ACC in the United States 
may be lacking, the scientific consensus is overwhelming.  Cook et al. (2013) reviewed 
11,944 scientific paper abstracts and found that of those that offered an opinion on ACC, 
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97.1% agreed that ACC is occurring.  In a 2016 Gallup poll, 65% of Americans affirmed 
the belief that humans are responsible for Earth's rising temperatures--a 10-point increase 
from the previous year (Gallup, 2016).  Although the acceptance of ACC may be 
increasing within the United States, a notable gap still exists between the public and 
scientific community.  
The purpose of the present study is to examine predictors of motivated reasoning and 
test for detectable differences in one’s critical thinking and reasoning when competing 
and supportive evidence were presented.  In the effort to do so, psychological, 
ideological, and demographic variables will be evaluated in their relationship to a 
vignette written response task assessing strengths and weaknesses of beliefs about 
anthropogenic climate change.  
Magical Thinking 
Beliefs exist in a wide array of manifestations.  A great many beliefs are referred to as 
magical thinking.  Matute, Yarritu, and Vadillo (2011) reviewed research concerning the 
implementation of false causal inferences for magical thinking.  The researchers explain 
that a false connection is drawn between two unrelated events and this is the reason why 
individuals hold beliefs for which there is minimal or even a complete absence of 
scientific validity.  An example of magical thinking might be an individual who wears a 
new coat to work and is fired that day, now attributing the firing to the ―unlucky‖ coat 
instead of a more probable answer, e.g., being late or poor prior work performance.  This 
example is hardly the only instance in which magical or superstitious thinking occurs.  
Magical and superstitious thinking greatly vary based on the content, affected 
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domains, and characteristics of individuals.  Harris et al. (1991) found that children 
exhibited fear of a monster in a box that they themselves imagined.   
Magical thinking is not limited to children, of course.  Fifty-four percent of adults in 
the U.S believe in psychic healing and 36% in the existence of telepathy (Newport & 
Strausberg, 2001).  Additionally, 65% of U.S. adults believe in Noah’s flood, 52% 
believe in astrology, and 42% believe that people can talk to the dead (Shermer, 2002).  
A 2005 Gallup poll found that approximately three out of every four Americans admitted 
to believing in at least one paranormal belief (Moore, 2005).  It is clear that magical 
thinking is a widespread phenomenon.  Although these beliefs and explanations held by 
individuals may often seem innocent, the issue is much more multi-faceted than may first 
appear. 
Research into magical thinking is often focused around ―the illusion of control.‖  The 
illusion of control is identified as a personal miscalculation of probability for success that 
stands in defiance of the true probability (Langer, 1975; Yarritu, Matute, & Vadillo, 
2013).  Langer found when situations based on chance were masqueraded as skill-based, 
participants felt they had more control over their environment than in actuality.  To 
exemplify this point, participants were placed in either a choice or no-choice condition 
for receiving a lottery ticket.  Despite the probability of winning being equal between the 
lottery tickets, participants placed more value on the lottery ticket that they chose in 
contrast to the participants who were not given a choice in the matter.  The probability of 
winning was not affected by the decision making, but by simply making one’s own 
selection, participants exuded a false illusion of control over the situation at-hand.   
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Magical thinking is pervasive in pseudoscience, for which there are five specific 
criteria: ―it lacks the cumulative progress seen in science, disregards empirical or 
established facts or results and a contradiction of what is already known, limited amount 
of internal skepticism, presents only vague mechanisms of how conclusions are reached, 
and lacks both deductive and inductive logic‖ (Feist, 2006, p. 220-222).  An example of 
the potential harm of pseudoscience can be seen in the Gerson Therapy. Gerson Therapy 
is an alternative medicine practice, referred to as "metabolic therapy," based on a dietary 
routine to treat cancer.  This vegetarian diet emphasizes low fat, low salt, high potassium, 
and regular coffee enemas (Munshi et al., 2008).  The American Cancer Society, 
supported by a panel of experts, has stated that the Gerson Therapy lacks scientific 
validity.  Despite a lack of evidence in support of alternative therapies, one study found 
that over 80% of its sample of cancer patients had used at least one therapy without 
scientific support (Miller et al., 1998).  The authors stated that such decisions bring with 
them financial cost and the possibility of interaction with supported treatments.  It should 
also be stated that avoidance of validated medical treatment can lead to premature death, 
a fact underlying the significance of understanding beliefs that are not supported with 
evidence.  
The study of pseudoscience, magical thinking, and other beliefs is important because 
of the gap in values and understandings between scientific and non-scientific beliefs.  
Mikulak (2011) reviewed the factors that contribute to the disconnect between scientists 
and the general public, citing communication break-downs and differing beliefs of how 
knowledge can be gained.  Investigating how thinking may differ and how beliefs are 
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acquired within individuals who display pseudoscientific thinking is central to 
understanding how the divide between scientific and non-scientific beliefs can be 
bridged.  Without this understanding, individuals will continue to be victims of false 
beliefs, with potentially dramatic consequences. The following subsections will cover 
constructs investigated in this study as they relate to beliefs that stand in defiance of 
scientific knowledge and explanations.  
Motivated Reasoning 
The essence of motivated reasoning is the idea that motivation influences cognitive 
processes in how we construct and evaluate beliefs.  Motivated reasoning theory is a 
framework from which we can understand how individuals respond to information that 
either confirms or disconfirms prior belief.  The motivation element refers to individual’s 
preference for a general outcome in a reasoning situation as well as the preference to be 
correct (Kunda, 1990).  Kunda (1990) distinguished between two types of motivated 
reasoning that seek conclusions based on either accuracy (i.e., the best available answer) 
or directionality (i.e., congruent to prior belief).  However, even in the presence of 
accuracy goals, biases are not eliminated (Kunda, 1990).   
Motivated reasoning is intrinsically related to, but distinct from, confirmation bias.  
Confirmation bias is viewed as the act of seeking evidence that confirms prior beliefs 
(Nickerson, 1998).  Nickerson (1998) reviewed scientific literature on the topic of 
confirmation bias and stated that confirmation bias, in part, encompasses a lack of 
awareness towards alternative evidence, unfounded preference for confirming 
information, and a bias for positive sources versus negative sources of information (i.e., 
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the addition of information instead of the absence).  Confirmation bias can be viewed as 
half of the motivated reasoning machinery, the other half being the disconfirmation bias.  
As the name implies, disconfirmation bias is the preference for disconfirming certain 
sources of information.  Taber and Lodge (2006) found that individuals' prior beliefs 
about gun control and affirmative action predicted devaluing incongruent arguments 
compared to arguments that were congruent, regardless of their quality.  The 
confirmation and disconfirmation biases work in tandem to motivate an individual's 
reasoning to a specific conclusion.  
Kunda (1990) also noted that cognitive dissonance is closely related to many studies 
on motivated reasoning biases.  Cognitive dissonance occurs when an individual holds an 
idea that stands in contrast to presented information.  Festinger, Riecken, and Schacter 
(1956) famously explored cognitive dissonance in the lives of cult members as they 
approached a prophecy doomed to fail.  The beliefs were not based on any observations 
or scientific data points (i.e., the individuals' beliefs were a priori explanations, as to a 
posteriori in nature).  The researchers investigated the hypothesis that individuals with 
strongly held convictions, when faced with a contradictory reality, will work to protect 
their beliefs by furthering the intensity of the belief.  On the night of the cult leader’s 
failed prediction for a great flood, an alleged secret message via automatic writing was 
received that stated the flood did not occur due to the great amount of faith the believers 
possessed, which convinced the believers who experienced the failed prophecy that the 
beliefs they held were correct.  
Klaczynski (1997) examined biases in everyday reasoning in a sample of adolescents 
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by presenting them with information that was either congruent or incongruent to their 
personal beliefs.  Klaczynski found that the best predictor for engaging in biased 
reasoning was personal belief (Klaczynski, 1997).  People were also more likely to agree 
with deductive arguments if they agreed with the conclusion offered (Markovits & 
Nantel, 1989; Rips, 1990).   
One explanation for why people exhibit motivated reasoning is ego protection 
(Klaczynski & Narasimham, 1998).  ―Many researchers agree that among the most 
important social motives are those to comprehend self and the world, to have a sense of 
control over outcomes, to belong, to find the world benevolent and to maintain one’s self-
esteem‖ (Lindeman, 1998, p. 285).  Through this lens, it is understandable why so many 
individuals gravitate towards protecting their beliefs.  In the pursuit of understanding a 
complex phenomenon like motivated reasoning, a number of perspectives and variables 
must be considered.  The following sections will cover predictors as they relate to 
motivated reasoning: cognitive style, personality, conservatism, dogmatism, and birth 
order.   
Cognitive Style/Need for Cognition 
Cognitive style is, in part, characterized by an individual’s disposition to engage in 
rational thinking (Stanovich & West, 1998).  Cognitive style and propensity to engage in 
differential cognitive processes have been extensively studied, often with varying jargon 
about related ideas.  Notably, Daniel Kahneman describes differences in what is referred 
to as System 1 and System 2 processes.  System 1 is characterized as being automatic, 
associative, fast, and effortless; on the other hand, System 2 is characterized as being 
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controlled, deductive, slow, and effortful (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  However, 
System 2 processing can become integrated into System 1 upon repeated activation and 
acquired ability (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  It is also possible that some decisions 
based on heuristics and biases work in conjunction with System 2 and are not solely 
under the guidance of System 1 (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  Similarly, Epstein 
(1994) distinguished between experiential and rational processing systems, noting that 
there exists empirical convergence on two prominent processing systems resulting from 
disparate research pursuits, one, abstract and analytical, the other, automatic and intuitive.  
A further overview of related theories about information processing and decision making 
can be seen in Epstein (1994).   
Differences in cognitive style can be facilitated by individuals having additional 
internal rules that work as a kind of higher order heuristic.  Examples of possible rules 
that individuals work through to aid in reasoning ability are ―consider possible alternative 
explanations‖ or ―don’t stop looking for evidence‖ (Stanovich & West, 1998).  The 
presence of easily retrievable rules allows for additional evaluation during reasoning.   
An often studied aspect of cognitive style is need for cognition, which is defined as 
―an individual’s inclination to pleasurably participate in thinking‖ (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982, p. 119).  Need for cognition has been researched in numerous ways, including its 
relation to interest in science, beliefs, intelligence, personality, and religiosity (Feist, 
2012; Kardash and Scholes, 1996; Pennycook et al., 2014; Sadowski & Cogburn, 1997; 
Woo, Harms, & Kuncel, 2007).  The body of research on need for cognition lends 
credence to its ability to affect behavior. 
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For example, in a study of juror decision making, need for cognition was examined as 
it related to jurors' ability to evaluate information (McAuliff & Kovera, 2008).  
Participants were given transcripts to read that included an expert witness testimony in a 
trial on sexual harassment.  It is worth noting that the participants were employees of the 
same industry from which the sexual harassment suit was derived.  This design allowed 
for knowledge of the given scenario to be equally understood by all participants and to 
reduce added insight in individuals who may have resulted in more knowledgeable jurors.  
The transcripts given to participants featured varying levels of internally valid arguments 
presented in an expert eyewitness testimony.  The jurors who scored higher in need for 
cognition rated the expert witnesses’ evidence higher when presented with evidence that 
was internally valid.  This capability was not found in jurors who scored low in need for 
cognition.   
Prior research has demonstrated that individual’s increased need for cognition is 
associated with higher levels of critical thinking.  Kardash and Scholes (1996) presented 
undergraduate students with two separate pieces of texts that gave two conflicting 
arguments on whether or not AIDs came about from HIV.  Participants then wrote a 
concluding paragraph to the texts.  Results showed that those who scored higher in need 
for cognition were more likely to expand on the inconclusiveness of the varied evidence 
to which they were subjected.  
Need for cognition shares a relationship with several personality traits.  For instance, 
Sadowski and Cogburn (1997), in a sample of undergraduates, found that need for 
cognition was related to neuroticism, openness to experience, and conscientiousness.  
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Individuals who scored high in need for cognition were more likely to be high in 
conscientiousness and openness to experience and low in neuroticism (Sadowski & 
Cogburn, 1997).   
Personality 
The study of personality has often converged on the presence of five dominant 
personality traits, commonly known as the Five-Factor Model (FFM) or the "Big Five" 
(Digman & Inouye, 1986).  The five traits are openness to experience, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.  Beyond its’ relationship with need for 
cognition, personality has been connected to a wide range of constructs, many of which 
are related to motivated reasoning. 
In investigating how personality traits, as measured by the Big Five, relate to 
religious beliefs, Saroglou (2002) reported that low domain scores in Openness to 
Experience were the best predictors of religious fundamentalist beliefs (to clarify: 
fundamentalists are those who believe in the literal word of a holy book).  In this meta-
analysis of 13 studies, there was a relationship between low scores in openness to 
experience and high scores in religious fundamentalism (Saroglou, 2002).  This means 
that those who tended to be higher in religious fundamentalism were lower in openness to 
experience personality characteristics.  Neuroticism was also negatively related to 
religious fundamentalism, meaning that those who tended to have higher rates of 
religious fundamentalism also tended to score lower on neuroticism.  Agreeableness 
however, increased with religious fundamentalism.  In the same meta-analysis, openness 
to experience was related to general religiosity, but the best personality predictors were 
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extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.  Openness to experience tended to 
decrease as individuals increased in religiosity, as was seen in religious fundamentalists.  
In contrast to openness to experience, as scores of religiosity increased so did scores of 
extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, all of which shared a positive 
relationship.  It is important to note that the present study will use two Big Five 
personality traits: openness to experience and neuroticism.  
Personality has also been studied in its relationship to typical intellectual engagement.  
Typical intellectual engagement is measured by individual’s typical engagement in 
intellectual activities (e.g., reading books, learning about scientific discoveries; 
Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Goff & Ackerman, 1992).  Goff and Ackerman (1992) 
found in their sample of undergraduates that individuals who scored higher in typical 
intellectual engagement tended to be lower in neuroticism and higher in openness to 
experience.   
Ideological Beliefs: Conservatism and Dogmatism 
Conservatism.  The political ideology of conservatism has been studied in its relation 
to information processing, cognitive style, dogmatism, motivated reasoning, and 
problem-solving (Alker & Hermann, 1971; Jost et al., 2003; Pennycook et al., 2012).  
Conservatism has also been repeatedly found to be related to feelings of threat (Jost et. 
al., 2003).  ―Threat has generally been operationalized in terms of threatening societal 
periods, threats to the legitimacy or stability of the social system, the salience of 
terrorism, rising immigration, and a host of other threatening stimuli, including thoughts 
about one’s mortality‖ (Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011, p. 796).   
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Conservative political views have been linked to disbelief in anthropogenic climate 
change (Gallup, 2014; McCright, 2011).  In general, self-identified liberals and 
Democrats are more likely to identify with pro-environmental views, than their more 
conservative counterparts (McCright, 2011).  McCright and Dunlap (2011) examined a 
number of nationally representative samples from the years 2001-2010 and found that 
educational attainment and understanding of climate change beliefs are moderated by 
political beliefs.  In this review, conservatism was weakly or negatively related to both 
educational attainment and understanding climate change (McCright & Dunlap, 2011).   
Dogmatism.  Dogmatism is defined by Altemeyer as ―unjustified certainty‖ (1996, p. 
201).  Altemeyer reasoned that those who are high in dogmatism would be more likely to 
be driven by directional goals in reasoning than those who score lower in dogmatism.  
Prior researchers found that dogmatism was negatively related to need for cognition and 
rational engagement, but positively related to the following: experiential engagement, a 
personal need for structure, close mindedness, and right-wing authoritarianism (Crowson, 
DeBacker, & Davis, 2008).  Not surprisingly, religious fundamentalism shares a strong 
relationship with dogmatism (Altemeyer, 1996).   
Bettinghaus, Miller, and Steinfatt (1970) evaluated syllogistic reasoning ability in a 
high-dogmatism and a low-dogmatism sample.  When neutral syllogisms were presented, 
no significant difference between the high and low dogmatism groups was found.  
However, those high in dogmatism scored significantly worse in syllogistic reasoning 
with positive and negative sources of information (i.e., information from individuals who 
were rated either positively or negatively).  In scenarios with information presented from 
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positive sources but with invalid syllogisms, individuals low in dogmatism outperformed 
their more dogmatic counterparts in accurately judging the presented information. 
Birth Order 
The study of birth order has captured the attention of many psychologists including 
such notable figures as Francis Galton, Sigmund Freud, and Alfred Adler.  The 
investigation of birth order has not gone without controversy and conflicting results 
(Ernst & Angst, 1983; Schooler, 1962; Sulloway, 1995).  Sulloway argued that in order to 
understand birth order effects it is imperative that researchers statistically control for a 
number of variables which have been found to muddle results including the following: 
social economic status, number of siblings, gender, and age gap between siblings (see 
Sulloway, 1997).   
Sulloway (1997) provided an empirical argument for the use of 'functional' rather 
than 'biological birth order'.  This methodology makes the distinction between going 
through childhood with a closely aged sibling or a sibling that is considerably older.  The 
age distance for classifying firstborns includes second born children who are 6 or more 
years apart from an elder sibling.  Only children are also categorized as being firstborns.    
Sulloway (1995) conducted a meta-analysis on the relationship between birth order 
and the Big Five personality dimensions and found converging evidence for birth order 
effects while seeking to diminish the ―file drawer‖ problem (i.e., the non-reporting of 
non-significant findings) and poor methodological design.  Sulloway (1995) found that 
birth order had the largest effect on openness to experience, with latterborns exhibiting 
more unconventional and rebellious personalities (z = 13.19).  Firstborns and latterborns 
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have also been found to differ in levels of neuroticism (z = 7.68), with firstborns being 
characterized as more anxious, fearful, and less well-adjusted (Sulloway, 1995).  
Firstborns are also more conscientious (z = 12.14) and less agreeable (z = 8.44) than their 
latterborn counterparts (Sulloway, 1995).  Though these results have not gone without 
controversy.   
The study of birth order has a long and contentious history.  Ernst and Angst (1983) 
provided evidence that there is not a meaningful difference in intelligence based on birth 
order.  Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2007) however found a significant, but small, 
difference in IQ based on social rank within a family.  Rohrer, Egloff, and Schmukle 
(2015) state that many of the findings around birth order may be more driven by 
methodology than reality, specifically, the study design differences inherent in within-
family vs. between-family designs.  The same researchers, in a multi-country sample of 
more than 20,000 individuals, found no evidence of personality difference based on birth 
order--furthering the conflicting evidence for birth order differences.  
Sulloway (1997) provided a comprehensive overview on the role birth order plays in 
a wide variety of outcomes.  The thesis of Sulloway’s book describes how latterborns are 
less likely than firstborns to seek parental favor, as well as more likely to reject the status 
quo and to accept revolutionary ideas.  In short, firstborns are more likely to conform and 
latterborns are more likely to rebel.  Due to beliefs around climate change having a 
contentious history, we will evaluate differences in anthropogenic climate change belief 
based on functional birth order. 
 
 15 
Hypotheses 
Based on these findings, we predict that individuals who exhibit higher level of 
motivated reasoning will be lower in need for cognition, more dogmatic and 
conservative, less neurotic, and also be lower in openness to experience than those who 
score low in motivated reasoning.  We also hypothesize that having higher levels of 
adoption of scientific attitudes will be associated with belief in anthropogenic climate 
change and a disbelief that addressing climate change would cause an unnecessary tax 
burden.  The latter part addressing a tax burden was included in the present study in 
response to a prominence of complaints of the financial impact of addressing climate 
change found in readings of popular media sources by the author.  
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Participants.  Participants were collected from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
system.  MTurk is a crowdsourcing surveying system and has been found to offer a more 
representative sampling procedure than that of convenience samples (see Berinsky, 
Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).  MTurk respondents are 
―workers‖ who are reimbursed small amounts of money by the researchers for their 
participation.  In this study, we reimbursed participants one dollar for their participation. 
Participants were limited to only those who lived in the United States, which was verified 
by IP address.  All participants were 18 years old and above.  
The total collected sample consisted of 477 participants. Thirty-one participants were 
removed from analysis for either not giving consent, missing at least one of the three 
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filter questions (e.g., "please select '4' for this answer"), or not completing the majority of 
the survey. One participant was removed for analysis for answering no to the last 
question of the survey, "Did you answer all of the previous questions honestly and to the 
best of your ability?" This reduced the number of participants to 446. An additional 69 
participants (15.47%) were removed from the vignette ratings due to not answering the 
prompt (see Appendix A for vignettes and Appendix B for examples of responses that did 
not meet inclusion criteria). In all, 377 participants provided rated vignette responses. 
There were roughly equal exclusion rates for not submitting a ratable vignette response 
between those who did and did not believe in anthropogenic climate change (ACC; 
16.15% & 13.71%, respectively).  
Design.  A mixed design was developed for this study.  The between-subjects 
variable was participants’ belief about whether or not climate change is primarily driven 
by human behavior.  The primary within-subjects variable was congruence.  The 
congruence variable had two levels based on whether participants were reasoning about 
congruent or incongruent information (in reference to their ACC belief) and was created 
from ratings of participants' written responses to a vignette assessing strengths and 
weaknesses of arguments for and against anthropogenic climate change.  Additionally, 
participants completed measures of openness to experience, neuroticism, need for 
cognition, conservatism, dogmatism, adoption of scientific attitudes, birth order, as well 
as demographic variables. 
Apparatus and Materials 
In addition to the MTurk platform for data collection, we developed a survey using 
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the online survey software Qualtrics, which facilitates the creation of multiple choice 
questions as well as open-ended questions.   
Measures 
Need for Cognition.  Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao’s (1984) short form of the Need for 
Cognition Scale assessed need for cognition (see Appendix C), which is an 18 item, self-
report Likert scale.  The measure is revised from Cacioppo and Petty’s ―The Need for 
Cognition Scale‖ (1982).  The two measures are correlated at .95 and the shorter scale 
has been found to be more efficient (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). The scales’ 
responses range from 1-5, with: 1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 2 = somewhat 
uncharacteristic; 3 = uncertain; 4 = somewhat characteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic.  
Nine of the 18 items are reverse scored.  Cacioppo et al. (1984) reported a Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient of .90.  Additionally, other researchers have reported test-retest 
reliability of .88 (Sadowaki & Gulgoz, 1992).  Sample items include the questions: ―I 
would prefer complex to simple problems‖ and ―The notion of thinking abstractly is 
appealing to me.‖  
Personality.  Two personality dimensions were measured using the Big Five 
Inventory (BFI): openness to experience and neuroticism (see Appendix D).  The BFI 
measure consists of 18 items with a 5-point Likert scale.  Sample items include: ―I see 
myself as someone who is curious about many things‖ and ―I see myself as someone who 
is relaxed, handles stress well.‖  The five dimensions of the BFI have test-retest reliability 
coefficients of .80-.90 (John & Srivastava, 1999; John et al, 2008).  Further evidence for 
the validity of the BFI can be found in John and Srivastava (1999).  
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Conservatism.  The Authoritarian-Conservatism-Traditionalism (ACT) Scale 
measured conservatism, more specifically social conservatism (i.e., in contrast to 
economic conservatism; see Appendix E).  The ACT Scale is a 36-item Likert response, 
ranging from -4 to +4 for levels of agreement.  Example items include: ―What our 
country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity‖ and ―It is 
important that we preserve our traditional values and moral standards.‖  Reliability  
coefficients for ACT ranged from .83-.94 in five separate samples (Duckitt et al., 2010).  
Dogmatism.  Dogmatism, defined as ―unjustified certainty,‖ was measured with the 
Dogmatism (DOG) Scale (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 201; see Appendix F).  The DOG Scale is 
a 20 item measure with Likert scale responses ranging from -4 to +4, representing: ―very 
strongly disagree‖ to ―very strongly agree‖ (Altemeyer, 1996).  Researchers have 
reported Cronbach’s alpha coefficients between .90 and .93 in three samples (Crowson, 
DeBacker, & Davis, 2008).  The DOG Scale has acceptable levels of both validity and 
reliability (Crowson, 2009).  Items from the DOG Scale include: ―I am so sure I am right 
about the important things in life, there is no evidence that could convince me otherwise‖ 
and ―I am absolutely certain that my ideas about the fundamental issues in life are 
correct.‖ 
Adoption of Scientific Attitudes.  One dimension of the Test of Science-Related 
Attitudes (TOSRA) scale was used: Adoption of Scientific Attitudes (ASA; see Appendix 
G).  The ASA scale is a Likert response, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, 
with 10 items being measured.  Average reliability coefficient for TOSRA in four 
separate samples ranged from .80-.84 (Fraser, 1981).  Example items include: ―I enjoy 
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reading about things which disagree with my previous ideas‖ and ―I am curious about the 
world in which we live.‖  
Belief Questionnaire.  Participants completed a short three-item questionnaire 
related to beliefs about climate change called the Brief Climate Change Belief 
Questionnaire (Caddick, 2015; see Appendix H).  The three items are: ―Do you believe 
that climate change (i.e., global warming) is occurring,‖ ―Do you believe that human 
activity is primarily causing climate change (i.e., global warming),‖ and ―Do you believe 
that addressing climate change will cause an unnecessary tax burden.‖  Responses to the 
second question about whether humans are causing climate change formed the 
participant's status on ACC.  In reference to the third question about a tax burden, the use 
of the word 'unnecessary' was used not only capture those who view taxes as a burden 
(e.g., taxes used for building new roads may be viewed as burdensome to many, but not 
unnecessary) but as a tax that is viewed as unnecessary in its implementation.  
Motivated Reasoning.  Participants completed written responses critically evaluating 
a vignette on the topic of anthropogenic climate change (see Appendix A).  The vignette 
introduces fictional scientists who speak as authorities on the issue of ACC, with one in 
support and one against ACC.  The scientists were created to have comparable credentials 
and present similarly flawed reasoning in support of their belief.  The vignette design was 
created across 5 separate pilot samples.  Originally each stance on climate change was 
presented separately, but this was forgone for an integrated approach that allowed for 
counterbalancing of the information being presented.  The piloting process aided in the 
creation of a vignette and allowed for both the elicited written responses from 
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participants and a rating system to be assessed and refined.  The implemented vignette 
featured errors in reasoning, seen in two logical fallacies (red herring and appeal to 
authority), and poor research methodology.  The scientists had equivalent types and 
numbers of logical reasoning errors used in support of their belief.  The presentation 
order of the scientists and their arguments was counter-balanced between two otherwise 
identical vignettes.  Participants were prompted to identify both strengths and 
weaknesses, if any, they found in the argument provided for each scientist.  Responses 
were written in a separate text box for each scientist.  An annotated version of the 
vignettes detailing argument structure and fallacies can be seen in Appendix I.   
Participant vignette responses were coded by a team of trained raters.  Statements 
within responses were categorized by whether they addressed a strength or a weakness in 
the argument and if the statement was valid or invalid (see Appendix B for examples of 
rated responses & Appendix J for Vignette Response Rating Manual used by raters).  
That is, some answers were deemed valid (e.g., "comparing temperature from two years 
is not enough evidence to solely support belief in anthropogenic climate change") and 
others invalid because they were not consistent with known evidence (e.g., "there is no 
way to measure past climates").  Raters added a value of one for every unique instance of 
strengths or weaknesses referenced in responses (i.e., expanding on a point did not result 
in an increase in score).  Each participant had eight categories of points based on vignette 
responses; there were four for each scientist: valid strengths, invalid strengths, valid 
weakness, and invalid weakness.   
Motivated reasoning was operationalized using scores from the eight categories of 
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participant's statements as well as participants measured belief in ACC (yes/no).  View 
Table 1 for an overview of how the variables were created.  Motivated reasoning was 
viewed as arguing for weaknesses in the information that was incongruent with the 
individuals' personal view, as well as arguing for the strengths in the information that was 
congruent with their own view.   
 
Table 1 
Motivated Reasoning Variable Derivation 
Variable Deriving Formula 
Congruent Reasoning Weaknessesincongruent view + Strengthscongruent view 
Incongruent Reasoning Strengthsincongruent view + Weaknessescongruent view 
Motivated Reasoning Incongruent Reasoning − Congruent Reasoning 
Note. Congruent and incongruent view subscript denote alignment of scientists' view with 
participant's anthropogenic climate change belief (yes/no).  
 
The rating system for participant responses, and the vignette itself, were 
developed and modified over the course of five separate pilot samples (see Vignette 
Ratings Scoring Manual in Appendix J).  All raters were blind to participants' belief in 
ACC.  Inter-rater reliability was assessed with Gwet's AC2 using a linear weight (see 
Gwet, 2008), due to the analysis' not having an assumption of independence among 
coders, the ordinal nature of the data, and the range of our ratings (0-4).  All statistics 
were computed in R using the statistical package 'rel' (Riccardo, 2016).  
After four individuals, author included, trained on pilot data and obtained 
reliability between .66 and .94 for all eight categories being rated, we were confident that 
all individuals understood the rating system (see Appendix K for complete inter-rater 
agreement overview).  After initial inter-rater reliabilities had been established, the first 
100 vignette responses (91 valid responses) in the presented data were rated 
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independently by raters who then met to collaboratively deliberate over any differences in 
ratings until 100% agreement was reached (agreement ranged from .66 to .95 before 
deliberation).   
The remaining participants (n = 347; 283 valid responses) were divided between 
three of the raters, with one rater (the author) rating all remaining responses.  Inter-rater 
reliability for these responses range from .74 to .96.  The two raters' score for each of 
these three sections was averaged into a single score which was used for analysis along 
with the first collaboratively deliberated section.  Although differing methodology for 
agreement was used within one dataset, results show a similar motivated reasoning trend 
across vignette ratings (see Appendix L for motivated reasoning scoring differences 
across raters).  More precisely, the relative pattern for levels of motivated reasoning 
across ACC belief was maintained for all ratings.  
Birth Order/Demographics.  Birth order was assessed in functional terms with 
five items that inquired about number of siblings, son/daughter birth rank, and distance in 
years from next older and younger siblings (see Appendix M).  Participants were coded 
as either a firstborn or latterborn.  Firstborns were individuals with a birth rank of one, 
were six or more years younger than an older sibling, or were only children.  Latterborns 
were individuals who had an elder sibling that was less than six years older.  
Additionally, a brief questionnaire inquired about participant: age, education, ethnicity, 
gender, income, religious belief, school major, and parental education (see Appendix N).    
Procedure 
 The survey software Qualtrics was used for data collection in conjunction with 
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Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).  All data were collected online.  The participants 
completed an informed online consent form prior to starting the study by clicking a box 
that stated they had read and consented to participate.  Participants then completed, at 
their own pace, written vignette responses, two scales from the Big Five Inventory 
(openness to experience and neuroticism), a need for cognition measure, a measure of 
dogmatism, conservatism measure, an adoption of scientific attitudes measure, and a 
demographic and belief questionnaire.  The vignette writing task was always presented 
first.  Next, all psychological and ideological measures as well as the belief questionnaire 
were randomly ordered in their presentation to participants.  The demographic 
questionnaire was always presented after the above measures.  Before completion, 
participants were asked a validity check question of ―Did you answer all of the previous 
questions honestly and to the best of your ability?‖  Lastly, participants were debriefed 
and thanked for their participation as well as given a task completion code for payment 
on the MTurk system.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables and ACC 
 Descriptive statistics for all the major demographic variables in the study are 
listed in Table 2.  Climate change (CC) was accepted by 91.03% of participants and 
anthropogenic climate change (ACC) was accepted by 72.13%.  The belief that 
addressing climate change would cause an unnecessary tax burden was agreed to by 
30.04% of the sample.  The average age of participants who accepted ACC was 35.71 
years old (SD = 12.60) and 40.43 years old (SD = 12.97) for those who rejected ACC.  
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Sixty-five percent of individuals who endorsed ACC were female and those who did not 
believe in ACC were 62.10% female.  The percentages of participants who had at least 
some college education for those who did and did not believe in ACC were 69.43% and 
61.29%, respectively.   
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
  
 Accepts ACC      Rejects ACC 
Variable n M (SD) / Pct n M (SD) / Pct 
Age 320 35.71 
(12.60) 
124 40.43  
(12.97) 
Birth Order     
     Firstborns 222 69.59% 92 74.19% 
     Latterborns 97 30.41% 32 25.81% 
College Education     
     No 76 30.57% 48 38.71% 
     Yes 218 69.43% 76 61.29% 
Gender     
     Female 208 65.00% 77 62.10% 
     Male 110 34.38% 47 37.90% 
     Other / Prefer not to say 2 .63% 0 .00% 
Ethnicity     
     American Indian / Alaska Native 2 .63% 2 1.61% 
     Asian 15 4.69% 4 3.23% 
     Black / African American 18 5.63% 11 8.87% 
     Hispanic / Latino 25 7.81% 4 3.23% 
     Native Hawaiian / Other Pacific Islander 1 .31% 0 .00% 
     White 251 78.13% 101 81.45% 
     Other 9 2.81% 2 1.61% 
Religious Affiliation     
     Agnostic 72 22.57% 13 10.48% 
     Atheist 53 16.61% 8 6.45% 
     Buddhist 7 2.19% 0 0% 
     Christian 128 40.13% 83 66.94% 
     Hindu 2 .63% 0 0% 
     Jewish 6 1.88% 0 0% 
     Mormon 2 .63% 4 3.23% 
     Muslim 2 .63% 2 1.61% 
     Other 48 14.73% 14 11.29% 
Note. ACC denotes anthropogenic climate change;  N = 445. 
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Planned Analyses  
Predictors of Motivated Reasoning.  A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was 
run to test whether belief in anthropogenic climate change could be predicted by 
psychological and ideological variables beyond that of demographic variables for 
motivated reasoning.  Demographic variables of age, birth order, college education, and 
gender were included in step 1.  Step 2 consisted of ideological and psychological 
variables: ACT (composite score of: authoritarianism, conservatism, and traditionalism), 
dogmatism, need for cognition, neuroticism, and openness to experience.  A zero-order 
correlation matrix is presented in Appendix O. 
 Demographic variables in step 1 were not significant predictors of motivated 
reasoning (F(4, 364) = .03 p = 1.00, R
2
 = .00).  When ideological and psychological 
variables were entered in step 2 there was a significant 6% increase in variance in 
motivated reasoning (F(5, 359) = 4.34, p < .01, R
2
change = .06).  Additionally, there were 
two significant individual predictors in step 2, dogmatism and neuroticism.  Participants 
were more likely to engage in motivated reasoning (not assessing whether the statements 
were valid or invalid) if they were more dogmatic (sr
2
 = .13) and less neurotic (sr
2
 = -
.14).  No other significant predictors were found, as can be seen in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Hierarchical MRC: Demographic, Ideological, and Psychological 
Predictors of Motivated Reasoning  
Predictors β sr2 a ΔR2 
Step 1: Demographic    .00 
 Age -.01 -.01  
 Birth order  .01 .01  
 College Education .01 .01  
 Gender .01 .01  
Step 2: Ideological and Psychological variables .06 
 ACT .12 .11  
 Dogmatism .13* .12  
 Need for Cognition -.03 -.02  
 Neuroticism -.14*  -.12  
 Openness to Experience -.04 -.03  
Note. *p < .05; 
a 
sr
2
 represents unique variance explained; N = 369. 
Gender coded: 1 = male, 2 = female; College education coded: 1 = 
some college; 2 = no college; Birth order coded: 1 = firstborn, 2 = 
latterborn.  
 
Two 2x2 Yates Chi-Square tests were conducted to examine whether participants' 
belief that addressing climate change would cause an unnecessary tax burden (TB) was 
associated with belief in climate change (CC) and anthropogenic climate change (ACC).  
Endorsing the tax burden statements was negatively associated with believing that 
climate change is occurring (χ2(1) = 49.59, p < .001).  Participants who believed in CC 
predominantly did not believe addressing climate change would cause an unnecessary tax 
burden (74.88%).  The majority of individuals who did not believe in CC did believe TB 
(80.00%).  Furthermore, belief in ACC predicted not believing that addressing climate 
change would be a tax burden (χ2(1) = 139.05, p < .001).  Individuals who accepted ACC 
were more likely to believe addressing climate change would not cause an unnecessary 
tax burden (71.77%), while individuals who rejected ACC were more likely to believe it 
would be a tax burden (85.98%).   
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We also hypothesized that adopting scientific attitudes would be associated with 
believing that climate change was real and that humans were causing it.  However, there 
was no difference found in adoption of scientific attitudes and belief in CC or ACC 
(t(444)=1.21, p =.25 & t(443)=.72, p = .48, respectively) .  However, the belief that 
addressing climate change will cause an unnecessary tax burden and individual’s 
adoption of scientific attitudes were found to significantly differ across belief, t(444) = 
3.71, p < .001, d = .35.  Individuals with lower levels of adoption of scientific attitudes 
were more likely to believe that addressing climate change would cause an unnecessary 
tax burden.  No significant effects were found between birth order and belief in CC, 
ACC, or TB (Yates Chi-Square tests, p's  > .05).    
Differences in Motivated Reasoning by ACC Belief.  A 2x2 mixed ANOVA was 
conducted to examine differences in ratings of participant's vignette responses assessing 
strengths and weaknesses in both congruent and incongruent evidence of anthropogenic 
climate change.  The between-subjects factor was participants' belief in ACC (yes/no).  
The within-subjects variable was motivated reasoning (operationalized by differences in 
congruent and incongruent reasoning).  Additionally, paired sample t-tests were used to 
further examine within-subjects effects of reasoning differences paired with Cohen's d for 
effect sizes.  Recall that focusing on strengths for a congruent belief and weaknesses or 
an incongruent belief is congruent reasoning, whereas focusing on weaknesses for the 
congruent belief and strengths for the incongruent belief is incongruent reasoning.   
Not taking into account whether a statement was deemed valid or invalid, differences 
in participant's reasoning was examined across ACC belief.  There was a significant 
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within-subjects effect of reasoning, F(1, 375) = 35.13, p < .001, η2 = .09.  Participants 
who rejected ACC were more likely to engage in congruent reasoning (M = 1.93, SD = 
.71) than incongruent (M = 1.10, SD = .87), t(106) = 8.93, p < .001, d = 1.05.  
Participants who accepted ACC did not significantly differ in their congruent (M = 1.66, 
SD = .81) and incongruent reasoning (M = 1.56, SD = .88), t(269) = 1.48, p = .14.  A 
between-subjects main effect between ACC belief was not found, F(1, 375) = 1.58, p = 
.21, η2 = .00.  There was, however, a significant interaction between reasoning and belief, 
(F(1,375) = 57.27, p < .001, η2 = .13),  such that participants who did not believe in ACC 
were more likely to exhibit congruent reasoning than incongruent reasoning, regardless of 
whether their statements were valid or not, while participants who accept ACC were 
equally likely to engage in incongruent or congruent reasoning.  A visualization of the 
contrast within the belief by reasoning interaction can be seen in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Motivated reasoning by anthropogenic climate change belief.  Error bars 
represent 95% confidence interval.  
 
 Psychological and Ideological Group Differences by ACC Belief.  Independent 
samples t-tests were run to test whether individuals significant differed in psychological 
and ideological measures based on ACC belief alignment (yes/no).  The largest 
difference between those who accept ACC and those who do not is that individuals who 
rejected ACC were much more conservative (as measured by ACT) in their ideological 
preferences.  This was true for each sub-measure of ACT: authoritarianism (d = .62), 
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conservatism (d = .37), and traditionalism (d = .92).  Participants who accepted ACC 
scored higher in neuroticism (d = .28) or, inversely, individuals who did not believe in 
ACC were measured as having higher levels of emotional stability.  There were no 
significant differences across ACC belief for adoption of scientific attitudes, dogmatism, 
need for cognition, or openness to experience.  Mean and standard deviation values for 
the psychological and ideological variables are presented in Table 4.   
Table 4  
Group Differences by Anthropogenic Climate Change Belief 
 Accepts ACC Rejects ACC   
Psychological and Ideological M (SD) M (SD) t Cohen's d 
     ACT 3.94 (1.53) 5.20 (1.62) 7.66** .73 
          Authoritarianism 4.32 (1.57) 5.44 (1.77) 6.52** .62 
          Conservatism 4.02 (1.68) 4.74 (1.72) 4.03** .38 
          Traditionalism 3.47 (1.81) 5.41 (2.07) 9.70** .92 
     ASA 4.02   (.47) 3.99   (.47) .72 .06 
     Dogmatism 4.88   (.34) 4.88   (.37) .18 .02 
     Need for Cognition 3.67   (.81) 3.68   (.84) -.22 .02 
     Neuroticism 2.74 (1.02) 2.42   (.95) 2.95* .28 
     Openness to Experience 3.90   (.66) 3.84   (.72) .91.. .09 
Note. N = 445. *p < .05; **p < .001; ASA denote Adoption of Scientific Attitudes. 
 
Post-hoc Analyses 
With a data set as rich as this one, there are always some unexpected and non-
predicted findings.  Due to the prominent representation of individuals who identified as 
"Christian" (47.52% of the sample), a Yates Chi-square analysis was conducted to test 
whether there was a difference in belief in ACC depending on whether or not a 
participant identified as Christian or non-Christian (i.e., all other religious affiliations, or 
lack thereof, were included as a group).  Individuals who accepted ACC were less likely 
to identify as Christian (40%), while those who rejected ACC were more likely to 
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identify as Christian (66.94%), χ2(1) = 24.93, p < .001. 
Differences in Reasoning by ACC Belief. Two separate mixed ANOVAs were used 
for different categorizations of participant statements (as assessed by raters) separating 
valid from invalid statements.  Participants differed in their motivated reasoning scores 
based on their belief in ACC (yes/no) for responses deemed valid (F(1, 375) = 29.23, p < 
. 001, η2 = .07), such that participants who believed in ACC were more likely to engage 
in incongruent reasoning (M = 1.35 SD = .75) than congruent reasoning (M = 1.09, SD = 
.69), t(269) = 5.22, p < .001, d = .36.  Participants who rejected ACC were more likely to 
engage in congruent reasoning (M = 1.56, SD = .68) than incongruent reasoning (M = .79, 
SD = .74; t(106) = 9.48, p < .001, d = 1.08).  There was no significant between-subjects 
effect of ACC belief (F(1, 375) = .43, p =.51, η2 = .00).  There was a significant 
interaction, however between belief in ACC and reasoning in vignette responses (F(1, 
375) = 119.36, p <. 001, η2 = .24).  As Figure 2 shows, individuals who believe in ACC 
were more likely to engage in valid incongruent reasoning and individuals who reject 
ACC were more likely to exhibit congruent reasoning in their valid statements.   
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Figure 2.  Reasoning differences for valid statements by anthropogenic climate change 
belief.  Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. 
 
Participants significantly differed in their levels of incongruent and congruent 
reasoning based on belief in ACC for statements rated as invalid.  A significant within-
subjects effect of reasoning was found, F(1, 375) = 7.89, p < .01, η2 = .02.  Participants 
who believed in ACC were more likely to engage in congruent reasoning (M = .47, SD = 
.66) then incongruent reasoning (M = .31, SD = .45) for invalid statements, t(269) = 3.71, 
p < .001, d = .28.  Individuals who did not believe in ACC did not significantly differ in 
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their level of congruent (M = .37, SD = .48) and incongruent (M = .31, SD = .49) 
reasoning, t(106) = .99, p = .32.  There was not a significant between-subjects effect with 
ACC belief, F(1, 375) = .96, p = .33, η2 = .00.  There was not a significant interaction 
between belief in ACC and levels of reasoning, F(1, 375) = 1.55, p = .21, η2 = .00.  
Figure 3, presenting invalid reasoning scores, contrasts with Figure 2 as invalid 
statements were less frequent than valid statements.  
 
Figure 3.  Reasoning differences for invalid statements by anthropogenic climate change 
belief.  Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. 
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Predictors of Reasoning Sub-categories.  The qualitative scoring of vignette 
responses resulted in 8 scored categories for each written response and was rich for 
further analysis beyond the main motivated reasoning variable.  Four hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses were run to test whether belief in anthropogenic climate 
change could be predicted by psychological and ideological variables beyond that of 
demographic variables for both the valid and invalid components of motivated reasoning 
as well as both total valid and invalid reasoning (not taking into account congruence of 
argument).   
Demographic variables in step 1 were not significant predictors of motivated 
reasoning assessing valid statements only, F(4, 364) = .41, p = .80, R
2
 = .01.  Step 2, with 
ideological and psychological variables, did not explain a significant increase in variance 
(F(5, 359) = 4.07, p < .01, R
2
change = .05).  In step 2, Conservatism was found to be a 
significant predictor of motivated reasoning with valid statements.  Participants higher in 
conservatism (sr
2
 = .16) were more likely to engage in motivated reasoning with valid 
statements.  Table 5 presents  beta weights and unique variance explained for each 
predictor variable. 
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Table 5  
Hierarchical MRC: Demographic, Ideological, and Psychological 
Predictors of Motivated Reasoning (Valid)  
Predictors β sr2 a ΔR2 
Step 1: Demographic    .01 
 Age .05 .05  
 Birth order  -.03 -.03  
 College Education .00 .00  
 Gender .04 .04  
Step 2: Ideological and Psychological variables .06 
 ACT .17** .16  
 Dogmatism .08 .08  
 Need for Cognition .03 .03  
 Neuroticism -.10 -.09  
 Openness to Experience .00 .00  
Note. *p < .05; 
a 
sr
2
 represents unique variance explained; N = 369. 
Gender coded: 1 = male, 2 = female; College education coded: 1 = 
some college; 2 = no college; Birth order coded: 1 = firstborn, 2 = 
latterborn.  
 
Motivated reasoning was also analyzed for invalid statements made by participants. 
Demographic variables in step 1 were not a significant predictor of motivated reasoning 
in invalid statements (F(4, 364) = .92 p = .45, R
2
 = .01). Ideological and psychological 
variables were not significant predictors of motivated reasoning in invalid statements 
(F(9, 359) = 1.78 p = .07, R
2
 = .04).  In fact, no significant predictors were found as can 
be seen in Table 6. 
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Table 6  
Hierarchical MRC: Demographic, Ideological, and Psychological 
Predictors of Motivated Reasoning (Invalid)  
Predictors β sr2 a ΔR2 
Step 1: Demographic    .01 
 Age -.08 -.08  
 Birth order  .06 .06  
 College Education .01 .01  
 Gender -.03 -.03  
Step 2: Ideological and Psychological variables .04 
 ACT -.05 -.05  
 Dogmatism .10 .10  
 Need for Cognition -.11 -.08  
 Neuroticism -.08 -.08  
 Openness to Experience -.07 -.05  
Note. *p < .05; 
a 
sr
2
 represents unique variance explained; N = 369.  
Gender coded: 1 = male, 2 = female; College education coded: 1 = 
some college; 2 = no college; Birth order coded: 1 = firstborn, 2 = 
latterborn.   
 
Two post-hoc hierarchical multiple regression correlation analyses were conducted to 
test whether belief in anthropogenic climate change could be predicted by psychological 
and ideological variables beyond that of demographic variables for the total of valid 
reasoning by participants (i.e., regardless if the focal point of the statement was a strength 
or weakness for a congruent or incongruent view) as well as the total invalid reasoning.  
We found that total valid motivated reasoning was not predicted by demographic 
variables (F(4, 364) = 1.28, p = .28, R
2
 = .01).  However, college education (sr
2
 = -.11) 
by itself predicted total valid reasoning.  Participants with at least some college were 
more likely to identify strengths and weaknesses that were valid than those with no 
college education. Ideological and psychological variables were a significant predictor of 
valid motivated reasoning (F(9, 359) = 2.30, p = .02, R
2
 = .06).  There was a significant 
change from Step 1 to Step 2, F(5, 359) = 3.09, p = .01, R
2
change = .04.  Conservatism 
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(measured by ACT) and need for cognition were found to be significant predictors in step 
2.  The more conservative a participant the less likely they were to identify strengths and 
weaknesses that were valid (sr
2
 = -10). Participants were more likely to identify strengths 
and weaknesses that were valid if they were higher in need for cognition (sr
2
 = .12). 
Table 7 contrast from Tables 5 and 6 due to not focusing on the congruence of the 
arguments with prior belief but instead on the total valid reasoning by a participant. 
Table 7  
Hierarchical MRC: Demographic and Ideological and 
Psychological Predictors of Total Valid Reasoning   
Predictors β sr2 a ΔR2 
Step 1: Demographic    .01 
 Age .02 .02  
 Birth order  -.03 -.03  
 College Education -.11* -.11  
 Gender .02 .02  
Step 2: Ideological and Psychological variables .06 
 ACT -.11* -.10  
 Dogmatism .03 .03  
 Need for Cognition .17* .12  
 Neuroticism .09 .08  
 Openness to Experience -.05 -.03  
Note. *p < .05; 
a 
sr
2
 represents unique variance explained; N = 369. 
Gender coded: 1 = male, 2 = female; College education coded: 1 = 
some college; 2 = no college; Birth order coded: 1 = firstborn, 2 = 
latterborn.  
  
We also examined whether invalid statements could be predicted by ideological and 
psychological variables.  Demographic variables were not significant predictors of total 
invalid reasoning (F(4, 364) = .50 p = .73, R
2
 = .01).  Nor were ideological and 
psychological variables (F(9, 359) = .61 p = .79, R
2
 = .02).  The inability to identify 
predictors of invalid reasoning, regardless of congruence with prior belief, is presented in 
Table 8. 
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Table 8 
Hierarchical MRC: Demographic and Ideological and 
Psychological Predictors of Total Invalid Reasoning   
Predictors β sr2 a ΔR2 
Step 1: Demographic    .01 
 Age -.03 -.03  
 Birth order  .03 .03  
 College Education -.07 -.07  
 Gender .01 .01  
Step 2: Ideological and Psychological variables .02 
 ACT -.04 -.04  
 Dogmatism -.01 -.01  
 Need for cognition -.11 -.08  
 Neuroticism .01 .01  
 Openness to Experience .04 .03  
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; 
a 
sr
2
 represents unique variance 
explained; N = 369.  Gender coded: 1 = male, 2 = female; College 
education coded: 1 = some college; 2 = no college; Birth order 
coded: 1 = firstborn, 2 = latterborn. 
 
Discussion 
We predicted that individuals who scored higher in motivated reasoning would be 
lower in need for cognition, neuroticism, and openness to experience, and more dogmatic 
and conservative than those who scored low in motivated reasoning.  However, we only 
found evidence for neuroticism and dogmatism predicting motivated reasoning.  
Motivated reasoning was marked by increased levels of dogmatism and emotional 
stability (i.e., low levels of neuroticism).  We found support for the hypothesis that 
climate change beliefs are related to the belief that addressing climate change would 
cause an unnecessary tax burden.  Those who believed in climate change and those who 
believed in anthropogenic climate change predominately disagreed with the view that 
addressing the issue would cause an unnecessary tax burden; in contrast, those who did 
not believe in climate change or those who did not believe in anthropogenic climate 
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change predominately thought that addressing climate change would cause an 
unnecessary tax burden. We predicted that higher levels of adoption of scientific attitudes 
would be associated with belief in anthropogenic climate change, but this was not 
supported.  Support was found, however, for our prediction that greater adoption of 
scientific attitudes would be related to believing that addressing climate change would 
not cause an unnecessary tax burden. 
Group differences in belief in anthropogenic climate change were investigated for a 
number of psychological and ideological variables.  The largest contributor to one's 
beliefs about ACC was ideological in nature.  Those who rejected ACC had higher levels 
of authoritarianism, conservatism, and traditionalism.  Additionally, these individuals had 
higher levels of emotional stability (a personality trait which is a polar opposite of 
neuroticism).  Notably, the split in belief in ACC was not associated in differences in 
adoption of scientific attitudes, dogmatism, need for cognition, nor openness to 
experience.  However, we found that those who did not believe in anthropogenic climate 
change were more likely to engage in motivated reasoning than those who did.  
Individuals who reject ACC were more likely to provide evidence to support their belief 
and less likely to provide countering evidence to their view.  However, individuals who 
accepted ACC provided equal reasoning for and against their prior view.   
Beyond the primary results, a number of secondary and tertiary examinations were 
undertaken.  After investigating the study's hypotheses, additional analyses were 
conducted to examine a subset of our motivated reasoning measure that teased apart the 
contributions of valid and invalid reasoning.  Interestingly, individuals who believed in 
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ACC were more likely to support incongruent evidence than congruent evidence in their 
valid statements (i.e., ignoring the invalid statements).  In contrast, those who did not 
believe in ACC disproportionately focused in support of congruent evidence, compared 
to incongruent evidence for valid responses.  However, in examining responses deemed 
invalid, those who believe in ACC were more likely to write invalid statements for the 
congruent view than the incongruent view (though the effect was considerably smaller 
than the effect for motivated reasoning in valid statements).  Individuals who did not 
believe in ACC were equally likely to make invalid statements in reference to both 
congruent and incongruent evidence.   
Predictors of the additional motivated reasoning sub-category variables were also 
analyzed.  Individuals were more likely to contribute to the valid components of 
motivated reasoning if they were conservative and emotionally stable.  Our 
psychological, ideological, and demographic variables did not consistently predict the 
invalid aspects of motivated reasoning.  When not taking into account the direction of 
reasoning (i.e., for or against anthropogenic climate change) but examining the total of 
statements deemed valid, individuals who had at least some college, were more liberal, 
and had a higher need for cognition, were more likely to make valid statements in their 
reasoning.  None of the variables investigated were able to predict total invalid reasoning. 
Implications of the Findings 
The present study supported the notion that motivated reasoning is a bipartisan 
endeavor.  Although the primary divider between belief in anthropogenic climate change 
was political orientation, the best indicator of motivated reasoning was not one's political 
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beliefs, but rather higher levels of dogmatism and emotional stability.  However, 
conservatism was the best predictor of the valid subset of motivated reasoning.  This 
supported the idea that beliefs create a filter through which we process information.  It 
was not that those who rejected anthropogenic climate change were unable to reason 
effectively.  In fact, these individuals in many cases were making valid points to support 
their belief.  Instead, their prior beliefs biased their ability to focus on both congruent and 
incongruent information in equal terms.  There is an impediment to recognizing flaws 
related to evaluating one's own beliefs, even if he or she can readily find errors in 
someone else's belief.   
Holding a belief congruent with scientific consensus does not bar one from also 
engaging in biased reasoning.  Indeed, there is evidence that many individuals who claim 
to be scientific and objective in their views also hold beliefs that stand in conflict with 
empirically gained knowledge.  The topic presented in the present work is an issue that 
largely affects individuals on the conservative side of the political spectrum, but 
politically left individuals are not free from such biases as motivated reasoning.   
As is often true in science, issues are not simply studied and presented.  Instead, 
proposed solutions are attached to the findings.  Correspondingly, the present work found 
a relationship between the view that humans are not primarily causing climate change 
and believing that addressing climate change will cause an unnecessary tax burden.  In 
regards to climate change, government organizations are often most notably the bodies 
seen addressing (or at least formally discussing) climate change (e.g., intergovernmental 
climate change summits, United Nations meeting, etc.).  Due to the linking of scientific 
 42 
knowledge with proposed actions, individuals may reject scientific findings as a function 
of their dislike for a proposed action (e.g., limiting carbon emissions).   
The present finding of conservatism being related to disbelief in anthropogenic 
climate change is supported by McCright and Dunlap (2011).  They found robust 
evidence for differences in anthropogenic climate change belief based on levels of 
conservatism in 10 separate nationally representative polls.  Notably, evidence for one 
side of ACC belief having greater scientific literacy or knowledge, as measured by 
adoption of scientific attitudes, or related constructs like need for cognition and openness 
to experience, was not supported here.  This is congruent with earlier research that did 
not find a difference in the levels of concern for climate change based on either technical 
reasoning capacity or science literacy (Kahan et al. 2012).   
The relationships between dogmatism, neuroticism, and motivated reasoning are 
noteworthy.  One reason dogmatism continues to be a robust predictor of denial of ACC, 
may be in part due to its' relationship with emotional stability.  Beliefs can be comforting 
to individuals.  Gray and Gallo (2016) found individuals who believed in psychics had 
higher levels of life satisfaction than those who did not.  This has been discussed in terms 
of extrinsic religiosity as well.  Individuals with extrinsic reasons (e.g., seeking comfort, 
security, and social connections) or intrinsic reasons (e.g., trying to live by a holy book) 
have been distinguished in their religious orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967).  
Additionally, people may find comfort in not challenging their views.  Engaging in 
challenging our own beliefs can result in uncomfortable or unpleasant feelings as we 
wrestle with uncertainty.   
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Limitations 
As is true of all studies, this one has its limitations.  Participant responses were 
completed over the internet and although steps were taken to maintain the integrity of the 
collected data, accuracy of provided information cannot be guaranteed.  Due to the 
reliance on Amazon's Mechanical Turk system for participants, it is likely that the 
collected sample is not entirely representative of the larger nation.  The creation of two 
new measures (ACC vignettes and Brief Climate Change Belief Questionnaire) had not 
been validated prior to the study.  Some vignette responses appeared to be driven by 
motivated reasoning: however, they were removed due to not meeting the inclusion 
criteria of assessing strengths and weaknesses in the submitted vignette responses.  Due 
to this standard, motivated reasoning was not captured in all of its forms.  Additionally, 
although the ratings were made blind to the participants' belief, it is still possible that the 
raters' own biases influenced participant scores.  The use of two separate rating systems 
within a single study may have influenced outcome variables used in analysis as well.  
Birth order was measured by grouping only children with firstborns who have siblings, 
which could have altered the outcome for this variable.  
Future Directions and Concluding Points.   
The present research examined motivated reasoning in an issue that has strong 
political polarization.  An obvious direction for future research could be a similarly 
designed study that primarily drives those on the political left to hold a view incongruent 
with current scientific understandings.  However, an issue where there is roughly 
equivalent division across the political spectrum may be more fruitful.  An example that 
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may fit this criterion is the debate around genetically modified foods (GMOs).  Although 
this topic is popularly viewed as an issue where liberals tend to be incongruent with 
science (see Azarian, 2015), recent research suggests that GMOs are actually not 
polarizing (Kahan, 2015).  That is not to say that misinformation is not widely present, 
however.  A recent Pew Research Center poll found that 88% of American Association 
for the Advancement of Science scientists say that genetically modified foods are 
generally safe, a fact that contrasts with the 57% of the public who feel that genetically 
modified foods are unsafe (Pew, 2015).  The staggering 45-point difference in opinions 
between scientists and the general public on this issue highlight the need for more 
effective transfer of scientific knowledge.  
The vignettes used in the present study were purposely written to be structurally 
similar to how information might be delivered on a television news show (conflict 
oriented vs. clarity).  Two authority-like figures are presented on either side of the issue 
along with their credentials, followed by the individuals offering reasoning behind their 
belief.  Evidence was introduced based on a study, but was presented in a shallow manner 
and not scrutinized.  As the present study shows, this format is ripe for motivated 
reasoning to occur within an individual receiving the information.  Such a finding is 
congruent with a prior finding that controversy in presented news information creates 
more uncertainty in the receiver (Corbett & Durfee, 2004).   
In a recent study, evidence suggested that it is possible to reduce incorrect beliefs 
about climate change through educational information (Ranney & Clark, 2016).  By 
describing the process through which ultraviolet light turns into infrared energy and 
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creates heat, individuals were able to reduce their level of disbelief in climate change.  It 
is important to expand our understanding of how we can find the 'most distilled 
representation of an idea' or 'most potent argument' and combine it with an effective 
presentation in both space and time.  
There is concern that individuals are increasingly living in echo chambers.  The 
ability to filter and customize one's media to only include information from sources 
already approved of and endorsed has never been easier.  An individual can easily foster 
and reinforce an unwillingness to engage with contradicting information by selectively 
choosing their own news sources.  News coverage has been identified as creating a 
platform for misinformation (e.g., MMR vaccination; see Speers and Lewis, 2004). 
Although social media is no exception to spreading misinformation, it also has the 
potential to remedy it.  Bode and Vraga (2015) found that by presenting correct 
information in an adjacent visual space ('related stories'), misperceptions can be reduced.  
Admittedly, finding successful strategies for getting individuals the right information can 
be challenging--though the importance should not be understated. 
Climate change as a topic was chosen partly because in the 21st century we have the 
ability to utterly transform Earth's landscape.  The abilities to create, alter, and destroy 
have never been so great in their magnitude nor ease.  Given the potential for greater 
consequences, there is greater importance upon our decision-making and reasoning about 
issues in relatively objective and less biased ways.  Recognizing that motivated reasoning 
is a widespread phenomenon, information generation should be artful in its 
dissemination.  The ability to make good decisions depends on good information, or more 
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specifically, on well understood and well-reasoned-about information—especially when 
that information may contradict our already held beliefs.  
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Appendix A 
Anthropogenic Climate Change Vignettes 
 
Note. Text within brackets is for descriptive purposes and did not appear in the survey. 
Participants received either vignette #1 or #2, which offer counterbalanced presentation 
of viewpoints/scientists.  
 
[First page] 
On the following page, you will be asked to read and evaluate an excerpt from a debate 
on causes of climate change. Both sides of the debate are presented along with some 
evidence. We want you to carefully read and evaluate both sides of the argument and 
discuss any strengths and/or weaknesses you see in either side. List as many strengths 
and/or weaknesses as you can think of for BOTH positions. Your thoughts are important 
to us, so be sure to express them clearly. You may take as long as you wish. 
 
Did you fully read the instructions above? (Please do so if you have not) [yes/no] 
 
[Second page] 
Instructions: Read the following short passage and identify strengths AND weakness, if 
any, you see in the argument or evidence presented. Please fully explain your response in 
the boxes below. Write your answers in full, complete sentences. Try to write at least a 
couple of sentences per answer.  
 
#1 An issue that has received considerable public attention is that of climate change. 
 Climate change has inspired a great deal of debate and has prominent individuals on all 
sides of the issue.  The biggest disagreement arises not so much about whether climate 
change exists, but rather whether the current period of change is caused by humans or is 
just in a natural cycle.  Dr. Helmholtz and Dr. Freedlander are both scientists who study 
climate change.  Dr. Helmholtz, a member of the American Meteorological Society, does 
not believe that humans’ contribution to rising CO2 levels is primarily driving global 
climate change.  He conducted a study that found that climate has varied throughout its 
history and cites this as his primary reason for his belief.  Dr. Freedlander, however, a 
member of the World Meteorological Organization, does believe that humans’ 
contribution to rising CO2 levels is primarily driving global climate change.  He primarily 
believes this due to a study he conducted that found that 2014 was hotter than 1990. 
 
#2 An issue that has received considerable public attention is that of climate change. 
 Climate change has inspired a great deal of debate and has prominent individuals on all 
sides of the issue. The biggest disagreement arises not so much about whether climate 
change exists, but rather whether the current period of change is caused by humans or is 
just in a natural cycle.  Dr. Freedlander and Dr. Helmholtz are both scientists who study 
climate change.  Dr. Freedlander, a member of the World Meteorological Organization, 
believes that humans’ contribution to rising CO2 levels is primarily driving global climate 
change.  He conducted a study that found that 2014 was hotter than 1990 and cites this as 
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his primary reason for his belief.  Dr. Helmholtz, however, a member of the American 
Meteorological Society, does not believe that humans’ contribution to rising CO2 levels is 
primarily driving global climate change.  He primarily believes this due to a study he 
conducted that found that climate has varied throughout its history and cites this as his 
primary reason for his belief.  
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Appendix B 
Examples of Vignette Responses 
 
Note. An ampersand in-between quotations denotes both responses from a single 
participant. Typos were cleaned up to improve readability in some of the provided 
responses.  
 
Examples of Appeal to Authority fallacies: 
"The only strength behind Dr. Freedlander is that he is a member of the world 
meteorological origination, which seems like a fairly exclusive group. I would think 
you would need good credentials to get into it." 
 
"Dr. Freedlander is a member of the World Meteorological Organization meaning he 
is looking to see how climate change effects the entire world not just one country, that 
is a strength." 
 
"Dr. Helmholtz is from the American Meteorological Organization meaning that he 
primarily looks out for the best interest of his country (America), this may be 
considered a weakness" 
 
Examples of participants using reasoning error of saying a particular stance is "common 
sense/intuitive/logical": 
"Dr. Helmholtz did not cite any studies in support of his view. Also, his view does not 
make common sense." & "I personally do believe that climate change is happening 
and it's a matter of common sense. Dr. Freedlander's view is in accordance with mine, 
although for different reasons. A strength is that he have a scientific study he can cite 
in support of his belief. I don't, but again, I feel it's a matter of common sense.  
Another strength is that he happens to be correct." 
 
"The strength of his argument is that it is simple and intuitive." 
 
"Dr. Helmholtz did not cite any studies in support of his view. Also, his view does not 
make common sense." 
 
"Helmholtz weaknesses: Yes, climate change has varied, but to what degree? He 
doesn't address any specifics, and he doesn't address the current acceleration.  
Strength: I guess that his belief makes logical sense." 
 
Motivated Reasoning Examples:  
"The Strength for Dr. Freedlander is the comparative analysis of temperatures between 
2014 and 1990. This data lends credence to his theories." & "Dr. Helmholtz weakness 
in his argument is a lack of empirical data to support his claim. Anyone can say 
something is true based on history or observation, but unless there is data to back it up 
you can't believe them." 
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"Dr. Freedlander to me doesn't have any strengths, his weakness is that he doesn't have 
much evidence of study or findings for his beliefs." & "Dr.Helmholtz strength of 
argument, I believe, is that climate temperatures have varied throughout history. I 
don't really see any weaknesses here." 
 
Examples of equivalent reasoning: 
"Dr Freedlander's argument simply looks at a point in time in the past, and notices that 
it is hotter now. therefore, he concludes, humans are responsible. this fails to take into 
consideration other factors, or even natural variation in the climate system." & "Dr 
Helmholtz's argument, that climate has always fluctuated and this is the reason for 
global warming, is also unsophisticated and limited. He fails to take into consideration 
factors like C02 that might be driving current climate change." 
 
"Just comparing two arbitrary dates whether it was hotter or not is not enough 
convince most people in my opinion. It would be better to show a comparison of many 
dates to show a trend of rising temperatures." & "I think it is obvious that climate has 
varied throughout history but can his study show that climate has changed as 
drastically as it right now in another point in history?" 
 
Example of off topic discussion: 
"Dr. Freedlander is either an idiot or a puppet for the elites. That's a huge weakness. 
The biggest factor of climate change is the sun.. always has been and always will be. 
So, now humans must be exterminated because we exhale CO2? WHAT?" & "Dr. 
Helmholtz is reasonable, that is his strength." 
 
Examples of items deemed not to address the prompt of assessing strengths and 
weaknesses in the respective scientists' arguments: 
"Climate change is happening and I don't care what anyone says."  
 
"The earth was all mostly ice once during the Ice Age, so what's to say there isn't 
going to be a "Hot Age"?" 
 
"Very smart" [referencing Freedlander] & "Seems ignorant of evidence" [referencing 
Helmholtz] 
 
"Humans may have some to do with change but it will still happen no matter if 
humans are here are not so it doesn't matter when it comes down to it. " 
 
"He is quick to go to the crowd" [referencing Freedlander] & "Dr. Helmholtz seems 
to be argumentative" 
 
"Believe that climate change contributed by humans' " & "doesn't believe that 
humans' contributing to global climate change" 
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Examples of unrated participant responses due to solely copying vignette text as their 
responses: 
"Dr. Freedlander believes that humans are contributing to climate change through 
rising CO2 levels.  His study found that 2014 is hotter than 1990." 
 
"... Dr. Helmholtz says he found through a study that climate has varied throughout 
all of history and does not think it is humans that are causing it. " 
 
"Dr. Freedlander conducted a study that found that 2014 was hotter than 1990 and 
cites this as his primary reason for his belief.  Dr. Freedlander is a member of the 
World Meteorological Organization." & "Dr. Helmholtz is a member of the American 
Meteorological Society.  He conducted a study that found that climate has varied 
throughout its history and cites" 
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Appendix C 
Short Form of the Need for Cognition Scale 
 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the 
statement is characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you 
(not at all like you) please write a "1" to the left of the question; if the statement is 
extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) please write a "5" next to the 
question. Of course, a statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely 
characteristic of you; if so, please use the number in the middle of the scale that describes 
the best fit. Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements 
below: 1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 2 = somewhat uncharacteristic; 3 = uncertain; 4 = 
somewhat characteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic.  
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.* 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure 
to challenge my thinking abilities.* 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to 
think in depth about something.* 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to.* 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.* 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.* 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11.  I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.* 
13. I  prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort.* 
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it 
works.* 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
Note. * Denotes reverse scoring.   
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Appendix D 
Openness to Experience & Neuroticism 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent you agree 
with the statement.  
1. I see myself as someone who... is original, comes up with ideas 
2. I see myself as someone who... is depressed, blue 
3. I see myself as someone who... is curious about many things 
4. I see myself as someone who... is relaxed, handles stress well* 
5. I see myself as someone who... is ingenious, a deep thinker 
6. I see myself as someone who... can be tense 
7. I see myself as someone who... has an active imagination 
8. I see myself as someone who... worries a lot 
9. I see myself as someone who... is inventive 
10. I see myself as someone who... is emotionally stable, not easily upset* 
11. I see myself as someone who... values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
12. I see myself as someone who... can be moody 
13. I see myself as someone who... prefers work that is routine* 
14. I see myself as someone who... remains calm in tense situations* 
15. I see myself as someone who... likes to reflect, play with ideas 
16. I see myself as someone who... gets nervous easily 
17. I see myself as someone who... has few artistic interests* 
18. I see myself as someone who... is sophisticated in art, music, or literature 
Note. * Denotes reverse scoring.  A 5-point Likert scale was used.  Openness to 
Experience & Neuroticism are sub-scales from the Big Five Inventory (BFI).  Openness 
to Experience items: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17.  Neuroticism items: 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 
16, 18. 
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Appendix E 
Authoritarian-Conservatism-Traditionalism (ACT) Scale 
 
Instructions: The following statements express social attitudes and opinions with which 
people may disagree or agree. Please indicate to what extent you personally disagree or 
agree with each statement by circling the number (ranging from -4 to +4) that best 
reflects your degree of disagreement or agreement with that statement. 
1. Strong, tough government will harm not help our country.* 
2. It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority.* 
3. Nobody should stick to the ―straight and narrow.‖ Instead people should break 
loose and try out lots of different ideas and experiences.* 
4. Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of 
your weakness, so it’s best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them. 
5. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in 
unity. 
6. The ―old-fashioned ways‖ and ―old-fashioned values‖ still show the best way to 
live. 
7. Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws.* 
8. Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, 
criticize, and confront established authorities.* 
9. God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed 
before it is too late. 
10. The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down 
harder on troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order. 
11. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children 
should learn. 
12. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.* 
13. Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who 
deserve much better care, instead of so much punishment.* 
14. Our country will be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders. 
15. This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, 
and sex, and pay more attention to family values. 
16. The way things are going in this country, it’s going to take a lot of ―strong 
medicine‖ to straighten out the troublemakers, criminals, and perverts. 
17. People should be ready to protest against and challenge laws they don’t agree 
with.* 
18. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. 
19. We should smash all the negative elements that are causing trouble in our society. 
20. People should be allowed to make speeches and write books urging the overthrow 
of the government.* 
21. Traditional values, customs, and morality have a lot wrong with them.* 
22. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be 
justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. 
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23. The more people there are that are prepared to criticize the authorities, challenge 
and protest against the government, the better it is for society.* 
24. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual 
preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.* 
25. People who say our laws should be enforced more strictly and harshly are wrong. 
We need greater tolerance and more lenient treatment for lawbreakers.* 
26. People should stop teaching children to obey authority.* 
27. The radical and sinful new ways of living and behaving of many young people 
may one day destroy our society. 
28. The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment would not do 
any good in cases like these.* 
29. The real keys to the ―good life‖ are respect for authority and obedience to those 
who are in charge. 
30. Trashy magazines and radical literature in our communities are poisoning the 
minds of our young people. 
31. What our country really needs is a tough, harsh dose of law and order. 
32. The authorities should be obeyed because they are in the best position to know 
what is good for our country. 
33. It is important that we preserve our traditional values and moral standards. 
34. Capital punishment is barbaric and never justified.* 
35. Our leaders should be obeyed without question. 
36. People should pay less attention to the bible and the other old-fashioned forms of 
religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is 
moral and immoral.* 
Note. * Denotes reverse scoring.  Authoritarianism items: 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 
28, 31, 34.  Conservatism items: 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35.  Traditionalism 
items: 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36.   
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Appendix F 
The DOG Scale 
 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent you agree 
with the statement. If you completely agree with the statement, select "4." If you 
completely disagree with the statement, select "-4." Of course, you may be uncertain of 
your agreement with a statement, if so, please select "0."  
 
      X. I may be wrong about some of the little things in life, but I am quite certain I am 
 right about all  the BIG issues. 
      Y. Someday I will probably think that many of my present ideas were wrong. 
1. Anyone who is honestly and truly seeking the truth will end up believing what I 
believe. 
2. There are so many things we have not discovered yet, nobody should be 
absolutely certain his beliefs are right.* 
3. The things I believe in are so completely true, I could never doubt them. 
4. I have never discovered a system of beliefs that explains everything to my 
satisfaction. 
5. It is best to be open to all possibilities and ready to reevaluate all your beliefs.* 
6. My opinions are right and will stand the test of time. 
7. Flexibility is a real virtue in thinking, since you may well be wrong.* 
8. My opinions and beliefs fit together perfectly to make a crystal-clear ―picture‖ of 
things. 
9. There are no discoveries or facts that could possibly make me change my mind 
about the things that matter most in life.* 
10. I am a long way from reaching final conclusions about the central issues in life.* 
11. The person who is absolutely certain she has the truth will probably never find it. 
12. I am absolutely certain that my ideas about the fundamental issues in life are 
correct.* 
13. The people who disagree with me may well turn out to be right.* 
14. I am so sure I am right about the important things in life, there is no evidence that 
could convince me otherwise. 
15. If you are ―open-minded‖ about the most important things in life, you will 
probably reach the wrong conclusions.* 
16. Twenty years from now, some of my opinions about the important things in life 
will probably have changed. 
17.  ―Flexibility in thinking‖ is another name for being ―wishy-washy.‖* 
18. No one knows all the essential truths about the central issues in life. 
19.  Someday I will probably realize my present ideas about the BIG issues are 
wrong. 
20. People who disagree with me are just plain wrong and often evil as well. 
Note. * Denotes reverse scoring.  Questions X & Y will not be used during data analysis. 
They are only present to familiarize participants with the type of questions the scale seeks 
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to have answered.  
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Appendix G 
Adoption of Scientific Attitudes 
 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent you agree 
with the statement. (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Not sure, 4 = Agree, 5 = 
Strongly agree) 
 
1. I enjoy reading about things which disagree with my previous ideas. 
2. I dislike repeating experiments to check that I get the same results.* 
3. I am curious about the world in which we live. 
4. Finding out about new things is unimportant.* 
5. I like to listen to people whose opinions are different from mine. 
6. I find it boring to hear about new ideas.* 
7. In science experiments, I like to use new methods which I have not used before.  
8. I am unwilling to change my ideas when evidence shows that the ideas are poor.* 
9. In science experiments, I report unexpected results as well as expected ones. 
10. I dislike listening to other people's opinions.* 
 
Note. * Denotes reverse scoring.  Adoption of Scientific Attitudes is a sub-scale of the 
Test of Science-Related Attitudes (TOSRA).  
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Appendix H 
Brief Climate Change Belief Questionnaire (BCCBQ) 
1. Do you believe that climate change (i.e., global warming) is occurring? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
2. Do you believe that human activity is primarily causing climate change (i.e., 
global warming)?  
A. Yes 
B. No 
3. Do you believe that addressing climate change will cause an unnecessary tax 
burden? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
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Appendix I 
Vignette Argument Structure Annotations 
 
#1 
An issue that has received considerable public attention is that of climate change. 
[Introduce topic]  Climate change has inspired a great deal of debate and has prominent 
individuals on all sides of the issue. [Introduce disagreement]  The biggest disagreement 
arises not so much about whether climate change exists, but rather whether the current 
period of change is caused by humans or is just in a natural cycle. [Framing issue]  Dr. 
Helmholtz and Dr. Freedlander are both scientists who study climate change. [Introduce 
individuals]  Dr. Helmholtz, a member of the American Meteorological Society, does not 
believe that humans’ contribution to rising CO2 levels is primarily driving global climate 
change. [Identify stance & appeal to authority]  He conducted a study that found that 
climate has varied throughout its history and cites this as his primary reason for his belief. 
[Methodological reasoning error & red herring]  Dr. Freedlander, however, a member of 
the World Meteorological Organization, does believe that humans’ contribution to rising 
CO2 levels is primarily driving global climate change. [Identify stance & appeal to 
authority]  He primarily believes this due to a study he conducted that found that 2014 
was hotter than 1990. [Methodological reasoning error & red herring]   
 
#2 
An issue that has received considerable public attention is that of climate change. 
[Introduce topic]  Climate change has inspired a great deal of debate and has prominent 
individuals on all sides of the issue. [Introduce disagreement]  The biggest disagreement 
arises not so much about whether climate change exists, but rather whether the current 
period of change is caused by humans or is just in a natural cycle. [Framing issue]  Dr. 
Freedlander and Dr. Helmholtz are both scientists who study climate change. [Introduce 
individuals]  Dr. Freedlander, a member of the World Meteorological Organization, 
believes that humans’ contribution to rising CO2 levels is primarily driving global climate 
change. [Identify stance & appeal to authority]  He conducted a study that found that 
2014 was hotter than 1990 and cites this as his primary reason for his belief. 
[Methodological reasoning error & red herring]  Dr. Helmholtz, however, a member of 
the American Meteorological Society, does not believe that humans’ contribution to 
rising CO2 levels is primarily driving global climate change. [Identify stance & appeal to 
authority]  He primarily believes this due to a study he conducted that found that climate 
has varied throughout its history and cites this as his primary reason for his belief. 
[Methodological reasoning error & red herring]   
 
Note. Annotations in brackets are of the preceding sentence.   
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Appendix J 
Vignette Response Rating Manual 
Each scientists’ position (both Freedlander [for human caused climate change] and 
Helmholtz [against human caused climate change]) will be rated on four dimensions: two 
weakness (valid and invalid) and two strengths (valid and invalid). Each box (8 altogether 
for each participant) will have either a 0 or 1 in it depending on whether it is present or 
absent.  
 
Coding System 
 0 = not present (weakness or strength) per weakness/strength  (i.e., one box can 
 get a score > 1) 
 1 = present (weakness or strength) per weakness/strength (i.e., one box can get a 
 score > 1) 
Weaknesses 
 Valid: legitimate logical or methodological flaws are correctly identified 
 Invalid: misinterpreted or misunderstood flaw (e.g., they think something is a 
 flaw but it is not) 
 
Strengths 
 Valid: legitimate logical or methodological strengths are correctly identified 
 if the person simply describes the position in the vignettes without describing it as 
 a strength or a weakness, then it gets a 0 
 Invalid: misinterpretations or misunderstood strength (e.g., think something is a  
 strength that is not) 
 
Coding Rules 
 If redundant with another answer count as only 1 
 If someone misinterprets a weakness point (e.g., they argue the opposite of what 
 the Dr. was saying), then mark 1 for invalid weakness; if they misinterpret a 
 strength point, then mark 1 for invalid strength 
 If irrelevant, mark a zero 
 If someone says the method of collecting data over time is a strength, that is valid 
 but if they use that to draw a conclusion about human caused change that is 
 invalid  
 If someone says one argument is more valid than another that is invalid (b/c they 
 are equally flawed) strength or weakness depending on context 
 If blank/nothing written, give zero 
 If someone argues for one vignette in the context of the other vignette, still rate 
 the first vignette on its own (as if it were in the correct box) 
 If someone confuses one scientists for the other but it's clear they are discussing 
 one vignette but labeled it with the other name, then rate the vignette not the 
 name 
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 If people agree with a stance but give no reasoning give it a zero 
 If the person merely describes a point in the vignette, count that as a 0; but if they 
 label it as a strength or weakness and it is such, then rate 1 point:  
 If the reason is vague (eg., ―he doesn’t have enough proof‖) then count as a 0  
 Rate each response after taking overall content of both boxes (F & H) into 
 account (i.e., sometimes what they say in one box affects how you rate what they 
 say in another box) 
 If they argue that this one study is the main or sufficient evidence then rate that as 
 a invalid strength (by itself one study can’t be sufficient evidence) 
 If the person makes an inference that goes beyond the vignette (e.g., ―A weakness 
 is that CO2 increase could be caused by cattle rather than humans‖) and it is 
 valid, then rate it as such (1); if it is invalid, rate it as such (0) 
 If the person says doing a study is a strength, then rate that a valid strength 
 
Partial List of Valid Weaknesses 
 No details of how studies were conducted; too small of a time frame (1990-2014;  
 Freedlander) 
 Freedlander believes humans are causing climate change 
 Draws overall conclusions from just one study 
 No evidence of how reliable and valid the assessments were.  
 No evidence presented that directly implicates humans or natural cycles;   
 differences (over time) don’t identify cause of difference; no evidence of cause  
 Both ignore the real evidence of looking at pre and post Industrial Revolution  
 changes (when humans really started to use carbon based machines and engines) 
 No evidence of the overall scientific literature (what do most studies show?); only 
 one study presented 
 Ignores evidence that modern CO2 levels are higher than ever 
 Argument is mostly just opinion 
 Helmholtz doesn’t compare CO2 levels over time, just states they are changing 
 Helmholtz: time points are not clear 
 If they point out that these studies are not sufficient to draw conclusions from 
 
Partial List of Invalid Weaknesses 
 Scientist defends his study 
 It may be biased 
 Can be attributed to cattle (because cattle contribute to methane not CO2) 
 Helmholtz: believes we are not responsible when we are at least a bit 
 Only climatologists can make scientific statements about climate 
 One person did the study  
 If someone argues that the article/paper was not peer reviewed and   
 therefore is a weakness, we will rate that as invalid weakness 
 Study is not logical/makes sense/intuitive/common sense 
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Partial List of Valid Strengths: 
 Conducted an (empirical/scientific) study 
 Measured temperature over time (Freedlander’s increases and Helmholtz   
 varied temperature) 
 Has data on temperature increase 
 Helmholtz: studies temperature over a long(er) period of time 
 If they state the person was a scientist and that the person conducted a   
 study 
 The studies presented say nothing about other sources of climate change   
 such as methane (produced by cattle) 
 
Partial List of Invalid Strengths: 
 Members of scientific organizations 
 Someone believes or doesn’t believe humans are causing it based on this   
 one study 
 He has studied this question 
 If they only state the person was a scientist and that is all 
 If they argue that two time points are enough to draw a valid conclusion  
 Study is logical/makes sense/intuitive/common sense 
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Appendix K 
Gwet AC2 Inter-rater Agreement Results 
 
 # of 
Ratings 
For  
VS 
For 
 IS 
For 
VW 
For 
IW 
Against 
VS 
Against 
IS 
Against 
VW 
Against 
IW 
# of 
Raters 
Pilot (1-50)           
Rater 1 42 .81 74 .82 .93 .79 .66 .94 .93 2 
Rater 2 42 .85 .79 .72 .89 .77 .77 .71 .68 2 
Rater 3 42 .91 .71 .81 .89 .86 .71 .76 .75 2 
           
Thesis (1-100)           
Rater 1 91 .84 .86 .91 .94 .73 .81 .81 .95 2 
Rater 2 91 .84 .82 .90 .86 .67 .73 .82 .88 2 
Rater 3 91 .82 .88 .88 .90 .66 .85 .81 .90 2 
           
Thesis (101-447)           
Rater 1 (101-116) 95 .85 .73 .85 .97 .75 .85 .88 .89 2 
Rater 2 (217-332) 95 .54 .80 .61 .89 .83 .79 .80 .87 2 
Rater 3 (333-447) 93 .78 .83 .79 .91 .65 .79 .84 .96 2 
All Raters (101-447) 283 .88 .89 .87 .96 .74 .83 .85 .95 4 
           
Note. "For" denotes belief in ACC & "Against" denotes disbelief in ACC; VS = Valid Strength; IS = Invalid Strength; 
VW = Valid Weakness; IW = Invalid Weakness; All raters were compared to author's ratings for inter-rater assessment. 
'Pilot' denotes earlier data used for rater training purposes only; 'Thesis' denotes data used in the present study.  
Numbers in parentheses denote ranges of participant responses with '# of Ratings' detailing responses that were deemed 
ratable.  
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Appendix L 
Motivated Reasoning Scoring Differences Across Raters
 
Note. ACC denotes Anthropogenic Climate Change belief.  Ranges represent slices of the 
vignette responses dataset.  Responses 1-100 were scored by four raters before the 
responses were deliberated and 100% agreement was reached; Responses 101-216, 
217,332, and 333-447 were scored by separate raters in addition to the author, who 
scored all responses, before the two ratings were averaged into a composite score.   
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Appendix M 
Birth Order 
1. How many siblings do you have? (i.e brothers and sisters) 
 Choices: 0-9 
2. In your family, what is your birth ranking? (i.e., were you born 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.). 
For example: If you are the eldest or an only child, select 1; if you have one older 
sibling, select 2.  
 Choices: 1-9 
3. What is your son/daughter birth ranking? (i.e., were you the first born son? Or the 
second born daughter?). For example: you might have been born second, but the 
first son/daughter. Select the number corresponding to your birth ranking among 
same-gender siblings.  
 Choices: 1-9 
4. What is the age gap between you and your next younger sibling in years? (i.e., the 
sibling born after you, but not necessarily the youngest in the family) If you do 
not have an younger sibling select "NA." 
 Choices: NA, 0-Twins, 0-Triplets, 1-20, 20+ 
5. What is the gender of your next younger sibling? (i.e., the sibling born after you, 
but not necessarily the youngest in the family) If you do not have an younger 
sibling select "NA." 
 Choices: NA, male, female  
6. What is the age gap between you and your next older sibling in years? (i.e., the 
sibling born before you, but not necessarily the eldest in the family) If you do not 
have an older sibling select "NA." 
 Choices: NA, 0-Twins, 0-Triplets, 1-20, 20+ 
7. What is the gender of your next older sibling? (i.e., the sibling born before you, 
but not necessarily the oldest in the family) If you do not have an older sibling 
select "NA." 
 Choices: NA, male, female   
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Appendix N 
Demographic Questionnaire 
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your gender?  
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Prefer not to say 
3. What is your major in school? (write "NA" if not applicable). 
4. What ethnicity do you consider yourself to be? 
a. American Indian / Alaska Native 
b. Asian 
c. Black / African American 
d. Hispanic / Latino 
e. Native Hawaiian / Other Pacific Islander 
f. White 
g. Other 
5. Do you live in the United States of America? 
6. Which of the following do you identify as? 
a. Christian 
b. Jewish 
c. Mormon 
d. Muslim 
e. Hindu 
f. Buddhist 
g. Agnostic 
h. Atheist 
i. Other 
7. What is the highest level of education attained by your mother or female 
guardian? 
a. Not applicable/I don’t know 
b. She did not attend high school 
c. She did not complete high school 
d. She completed high school or got her G.E.D. 
e. She completed some college classes but did not receive a degree 
f. She received an associate's degree 
g. She received bachelor’s degree 
h. She attended graduate school but did not receive a degree 
i. She received a graduate degree (master's, MBA, Ph.D., etc) 
8. What is the highest level of education attained by your father or male guardian? 
a. Not applicable/I don’t know 
b. He did not attend high school 
c. He did not complete high school 
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d. He completed high school or got her G.E.D. 
e. He completed some college classes but did not receive a degree 
f. He received an associate's degree 
g. He received bachelor’s degree 
h. He attended graduate school but did not receive a degree 
i. He received a graduate degree (master's, MBA, Ph.D., etc) 
9. What was your total family income last year (from all sources, before taxes)? This 
refers to the combined incomes of all individuals living in your home. (Please 
select one.) 
a. Less than 15,999 
b. $15,999 to $19,999 
c. $20,000 to $29,999 
d. $30,000 to $39,999 
e. $40,000 to $49,999 
f. $50,000 to $59,999 
g. $60,000 to $69,999 
h. $70,000 to $79,999 
i. $80,000 to $89,999 
j. $90,000 or more 
10. What was your personal income last year? This refers only to your personal 
income, and does NOT include the income of others living in your home. (Please 
select one.) 
a. Less than 15,999 
b. $15,999 to $19,999 
c. $20,000 to $29,999 
d. $30,000 to $39,999 
e. $40,000 to $49,999 
f. $50,000 to $59,999 
g. $60,000 to $69,999 
h. $70,000 to $79,999 
i. $80,000 to $89,999 
j. $90,000 or more 
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Appendix O  
Zero-Order Correlations 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 
1. ACC -- -.34** -.17** .03 -.30** .05 .51** -.19** .01 .03 -.36** -.49** .06 .14** -.01 .04 -.56** .05 .04 -.42** 
2. ACT  -- .11* -.32** .91** -.06 -.30** .90** .08 .12* .15** .18** .00 -.12* -.23** -.26** .33** -.03 -.15** .90** 
3. Age   -- .04 .07 .10* -.13** .06 .01 .05 .07 .12* -.05 -.29** .06 .10* .09 -.03 -.05 .15** 
4. ASA    -- -.31** -.05 .06 -.28** -.17** .05 -.08 -.02 -.10* -.16** .56** .49** -.17** -.09 .12* -.28** 
5. Authoritarianism     -- -.07 -.27** .77** .93* .09 .13* .14** .04 -.11* -.22** -.27** .30** -.03 -.15** .71** 
6. Birth Order      -- .03 -.06 -.11* .00 .02 -.03 .07 .00 .00 .10* -.02 .02 -.03 -.04 
7. CC       -- -.19** -.03 .01 -.21** -.26** .00 .11* .00 .07 -.34** .04 .03 -.33** 
8. Conservatism        -- .06 .12* .09 .10* .01 -.10* -.21** -.22** .20** .00 -.17** .69** 
9. DOG         -- -.05 .12* .09 .09 -.05 -.06 -.01 .09 .00 -.03 .07 
10. Gender          -- .01 .04 -.03 .15** -.09 -.02 -.06 .02 .02 .12* 
11. MR           -- .80** .58** -.15** -.04 -.04 .24** .15** -.13* .17** 
12. MR Valid            -- -.02 -.14** .03 .00 .30** -.03 -.10 .24** 
13. MR Invalid             -- -.06 -.10 -.08 -.01 .28** -.08 -.04 
14. Neuroticism               -- -.28** -.22** -.07 .03 .04 -.11* 
15. NFC               -- .65** -.11* -.08 .15** -.19** 
16. Openness                -- -.11* -.04 .08 -.22** 
17. TB                 -- -.01 -.11* .39** 
18. TIR                  -- -.25** -.04 
19. TVR                   -- -.10* 
20. Traditionalism                    -- 
Note. Significance levels: * < .05; ** < .01; ACC = Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change (0=No, 1=Yes); ACT = Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism composite score; ASA denotes Adoption of Scientific 
Attitudes; CC= Belief in Climate Change (0=No, 1=Yes); Birth Order coded 1=firstborn, 2=latterborn; Gender coded 0=Male, 1=Female; MR denotes motivated  reasoning; TB = Belief addressing CC will cause unnecessary tax 
burden (0=No, 1=Yes); TIR=Total Invalid Reasoning; TVR=Total Valid Reasoning; Openness denotes Openness to Experience; 
 
 
